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Abstract 
Hurricane Matthew, one of recent history’s most devastating natural disasters, had a 
severe impact on parts of the Southeastern U.S. and Haiti. This research looked at how 
four non-profit organizations, The American Red Cross, The Salvation Army USA, Hope 
for Haiti, and World Vision Haiti, used Twitter to communicate crisis response strategies 
with the public. Guided by the SCCT, this study implemented a qualitative textual 
analysis of the organizations’ Tweets in the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases of the 
disaster. The research findings indicated a disconnect between theoretical response 
recommendations and Twitter communication. Recommendations for practical 
implications of this research included a need for greater consideration, on the part of 
practitioners, organizations, and others involved in crisis communication, of SCCT 
response recommendations, Twitter as a unique and growing communication outlet, and 
target audience of response strategies and crisis communication.  
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Introduction 
 On September 28, 2016, meteorologists began tracking Hurricane Matthew, the 
most devastating hurricane in recent history. The storm left a path of destruction from the 
Caribbean to the Southeast United States. Matthew formed near the Windward Islands, 
on the eastern edge of the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, moving on to severely 
impact parts of Haiti, Cuba, and U.S. states of Florida, Georgia, and The Carolinas (The 
Weather Channel, 2016). On October 9, Matthew moved away from the U.S. coastline 
and was labeled post-tropical; however, the hurricane left thousands of Haitians and 
Americans homeless, injured, or dead in its aftermath. Throughout the crisis, residents of 
Haiti and the U.S. turned to the media for answers, seeking information about relief 
efforts during and after the storm’s destruction. Through the media, organizations 
providing aid communicated with the public about the crisis. Haitians and Americans 
used social media sites, particularly Twitter, to receive information on disaster 
preparedness, emergency relief response, or how to help those affected. The American 
and Haitian publics relied on Tweets by The American Red Cross, The Salvation Army 
USA, Hope for Haiti, and World Vision non-profit organizations, for help or to help 
those in need.		
	 The American Red Cross (ARC) and The Salvation Army were two of the largest 
non-profit organizations that provided information and relief during and after Hurricane 
Matthew. Both of these organizations’ efforts were focused primarily on aiding those 
affected in the Southeastern U.S., where Matthew did most of its damage. The ARC is a 
humanitarian, non-profit organization that provides emergency assistance in the U.S., and 
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disaster safety education. During Hurricane Matthew, The ARC provided affected areas 
in the southeastern U.S. with response tactics, relief, and coping education (American 
Red Cross, 2015). Additionally, The Salvation Army USA, which is the U.S. focused 
non-profit affiliate of The Salvation Army, responded to Hurricane Matthew, providing 
food, clothing, and comfort to those affected (The Salvation Army USA, 2017). Both The 
ARC and The Salvation Army USA communicated disaster response information over 
Twitter, keeping those affected up-to-date with preparedness and relief information, as 
well as sending teams to areas in the Southeastern U.S. most severely affected.   
 Other non-profit organizations responded to the crisis by providing relief and 
response communication to Haiti and those affected outside of the U.S. Hope for Haiti 
and World Vision Haiti were two of the largest non-profit contributors to disaster 
response and relief in Haiti during Hurricane Matthew. Hope for Haiti is a U.S. based 
non-profit organization focused on relief in affected areas in Haiti, including 
communication with the Haitian people to serve their needs during disasters. Similarly, 
World Vision Haiti, the local Haiti affiliate of World Vision International non-profit, 
works to build partnerships with the people of Haiti to help communities, families, and 
children meet immediate needs. As was the case with The ARC and The Salvation Army 
USA, both Hope for Haiti and World Vision Haiti used Twitter to communicate disaster 
preparedness and relief response communications during Hurricane Matthew. Rather than 
targeting the affected areas in the Southeastern U.S., as The ARC and The Salvation 
Army USA did, Hope for Haiti and World Vision Haiti’s communication response 
strategies were focused on Haiti in particular.  
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Due to the unexpected nature of crises, particularly natural disasters like 
Hurricane Matthew, there is a level of uncertainty that arises in individuals, causing 
discomfort and a desire to reduce that discomfort (Berger, 1987). This element of 
uncertainty and danger causes people to reach out to media outlets and actively engage in 
information seeking (Brashers, et al., 2000). As the public grows increasingly reliant 
upon mobile and social media for information during crises, social media have begun to 
eclipse the mass media as a dominant source of information (Heath, et al., 1995). The use 
of social media for communication purposes during high consequence events has 
increased in recent years. In particular, Twitter has developed into one of the most widely 
used sources of news and information (Morris, et al., 2010; Sin & Kim, 2013). During 
crises, emergency responders such as The ARC, The Salvation Army USA, Hope for 
Haiti, and World Vision Haiti, should include social media to communicate effectively 
with their intended audiences (Lachlan, et al., 2016). Crisis communication focuses on 
responding to immediate public needs for information (Seeger, et al., 2008), and given 
the immediacy of Twitter and its widespread accessibility, many organizations use this 
channel to communicate with those affected or those willing to provide aid (Coombs, 
2015). The ARC, The Salvation Army USA, Hope for Haiti, and World Vision Haiti, all 
utilized Twitter to provide crisis response strategies to communicate with target publics 
during Hurricane Matthew.   
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) evolved from a number of 
studies that address how the nature of a crisis shapes the respective response strategy 
(Coombs, 2007). The matched response/crisis typology is designed to protect the 
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organization’s reputation and meet public information needs. In the case of natural 
disasters, such as Hurricane Matthew, there are additional concerns that are addressed by 
SCCT and response strategies, including public safety (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Past 
research has shown that providing instructing information, information that the public 
needs to know in the wake of a crisis, is a necessary first step in crisis communication 
response strategy, prior to addressing an organization’s reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 
2002; Coombs, 1999; Sturges, 1994). In the case of natural disasters, instructing 
information may include informing the public of available shelters, letting people know 
where to go to receive relief supplies, or providing information on recovery after the 
disaster.  
Benoit (1995, 1997) developed a list of 14 image restoration strategies for 
organizations to use in the wake of a crisis to protect and restore threats to their 
reputations. Image restoration is primarily focused on the content of the messages 
following a crisis, more so than focusing on the crisis type or crisis phases. Additionally, 
image restoration strategies are used to protect the reputation of a corporation following a 
crisis in which the corporation, or an affiliate of the corporation, is to blame for the crisis 
event. In the case of natural disasters, there is a very low level of crisis responsibility, or 
blame to be put on an organization. Therefore, Benoit’s image restoration strategies were 
expanded upon with SCCT. This theory both includes and focuses on the crisis type, with 
the goal to match response strategies to the type of crisis situation (Coombs & Holladay, 
2002). Coombs (2015) adapted the response strategies to fit a range of crisis types, 
including Hurricane Matthew. Due to the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of 
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natural disasters, the crisis type needed to be taken into account when looking at possible 
response strategies. Therefore, Coombs’ adapted SCCT response strategies were chosen 
as the most appropriate theoretical framework for understanding natural disasters and the 
response strategies meant for this type of crisis.  
The bulk of SCCT research has primarily relied on experimental, survey, and 
quantitative content analysis methods (Lachlan, et al., 2014; Jin, et al., 2011; Coombs, 
2004; Schultz, et al., 2011; Claeys, et al., 2010). This work has provided an assessment 
of corporations using particular response strategies, primarily in the employment of 
reputation repair strategies following internal crises. The only prior study that addressed 
non-profit organizations using SCCT, found a discrepancy between response strategy 
recommendations and actual strategies used by The ARC. This analysis, however, used 
news articles rather than social media. While prior studies established a relationship 
between recommended response strategies and actual output, prior research is lacking in 
its ability to represent the actual language used in organizations’ Twitter 
communications. This has left a gap in the literature addressing response strategies over 
social media, and textually analyzing those strategies in order to understand how the 
output aligns with suggested responses. It is also critical to understand how different 
types of organizations communicate following crises. Qualitative analysis, particularly 
textual coding used in this study, allowed for total immersion in the data, creating an 
understanding of nuances, details, and subtleties (Saldaña, 2009) in crisis communication, 
and offered the opportunity to analyze the verbatim Tweets of the four organizations 
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included in this study. The current study’s design examines differences including 
response strategies and recommendations, and target location and public.  
Additionally, given the increase in organizations’ social media presences, and the 
growing need to seek information through social media channels, it is important to look 
at how these organizations are communicating information about crises. The channel 
decision has become more complex due to the number of media outlets, as well as 
pressure from experts to switch to communication over social media (Coombs, 2015). 
This makes Twitter an interesting platform, since social media has become a natural part 
of the search for information during a crisis (Coombs, 2015). Further, given that the news 
media often ignore attempts to infuse organizations’ sides of crises into coverage 
(Holladay, 2009), Twitter becomes an increasingly important venue to understand how 
organizations are communicating when a crisis occurs. Specifically, an examination of 
Tweets allows the organizational messages to be evaluated unfiltered by another media 
outlet.  
This research took a qualitative approach to analyze the various text-based 
response strategies used by The ARC, The Salvation Army USA, Hope for Haiti, and 
World Vision Haiti over Twitter. In doing so, it makes three contributions to our 
understanding of crisis communication. First, although there has been prior quantitative 
content analysis research on mitigating crisis response strategies through Twitter and 
social media channels (Lachlan, et al., 2014), there has not yet been extensive qualitative 
textual data analysis looking at organizations’ crisis response strategies over social media 
to certain publics over Twitter. This void is particularly problematic given the increased 
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use of Twitter and its application for quick information dissemination. Second, there has 
been no previous research comparing organizations’ response strategies via Twitter in 
relation to different publics with which they were communicating. A notable exception is 
the research of Lachlan, et al. (2014) that used content analysis on Tweets from the public 
during Hurricane Sandy to assess differences in communications on the basis of 
demographics. The colleagues found very few significant differences, but concluded that 
Twitter is still useful in managing emergences (Lachlan, et al., 2014). While 
demographic differences were addressed in this research, the study did not address 
differences between communications based on the type of organization. Third, past 
research looking at crisis response has primarily used experimental research design. For 
example, Jin, et al. (2011) used experimental methods to address publics’ anticipation of 
how organizations should respond to a crisis, and found that preferred information form 
(social media, traditional media, or word-of-mouth) and source (organization in a crisis or 
third party) influence how the public thinks organizations should respond (Jin, et al., 
2011). The current study will expand previous research to address how non-profit 
organizations are communicating in relation to recommended response strategies outlined 
in Coombs (2015). This will allow for a more thorough understanding of how 
organizations use social media during natural disasters, and will provide guidance to 
improve response strategies over social media for crises in the future.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
relevant literature including an overview of Hurricane Matthew, The ARC, The Salvation 
Army USA, Hope for Haiti, and World Vision Haiti. The theoretical framework that 
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guides this study is presented as are the research questions. Chapter 3 explicates the 
methods employed in this study including sampling and data analysis procedures. 
Chapter 4 presents the results and chapter 5 offers a discussions of the findings and their 
contributions to theory and practice. Finally, the thesis concludes with a summary of the 
study and the ways in which it has contributed to crisis communication.   
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Literature Review 
 The literature review begins with an overview of the disaster of Hurricane 
Matthew. Next, it provides a brief explication of The ARC, The Salvation Army USA, 
Hope for Haiti, and World Vision Haiti. It will then discuss crisis communication and 
crisis response strategies and social media. The chapter concludes with an overview of 
the theoretical foundation for this research, Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
(SCCT), and the research questions that guide the study.  
Hurricane Matthew and its destruction in the Atlantic  
Hurricane Matthew was a long-lasting, powerful hurricane that became the first 
Category 5 hurricane originating in the Atlantic since 2007. Matthew formed in the 
aftermath of a tropical wave that pushed off the coast of Africa in late September, 2016, 
eventually reaching its peak intensity on September 30, with winds reaching 160 mph. 
Matthew made landfall in Haiti and Eastern Cuba on October 4, 2016 as a Category 4, 
causing severe destruction in these areas. It eventually moved to the Bahamas on October 
5, reaching the Southeastern U.S. shortly thereafter. Once Matthew reached the 
Southeastern U.S., it moved toward the coasts of Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and 
North Carolina with 75 mph winds. The following day, Matthew was declared post-
tropical by the National Hurricane Center (The Weather Channel, 2016).  
Matthew brought widespread damage and catastrophic loss of life. An estimated 
1,600 deaths were attributed to the storm and its destruction, across parts of Haiti, Cuba, 
and the Southeastern U.S., making Matthew the deadliest Atlantic hurricane since 2005. 
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In addition, damages were estimated to have reached nearly $10.5 billion (USD), making 
Matthew the costliest Atlantic Hurricane since 2012 (Petkar, 2016).  
The death toll in Haiti alone soared to over 800, and the aftermath has continued 
to affect an even larger number of lives as the reconstruction process continues. The city 
of Jeremie recorded nearly 80 percent of its buildings destroyed by Matthew. In the 
nearby province of Sud, nearly 30,000 homes were destroyed, leaving many Haitians 
homeless in the aftermath of the storm. In the U.S., Florida, the Carolinas, and Georgia 
were affected most severely, causing a small number of deaths in comparison to Haiti, 
but a mass amount of destruction caused by record-breaking flooding (BBC, 2016). 
Within the most severely affected areas, non-profit organizations provided response and 
relief. The ARC and The Salvation Army USA provided aid to devastated areas in the 
Southeastern U.S., focusing on the areas that were most severely impacted by Hurricane 
Matthew, such as Florida, Georgia and the Carolinas. In contrast, Hope for Haiti and 
World Vision Haiti have focused relief efforts on Haiti, helping this area in the aftermath 
of Matthew’s destruction.  
Given the long-lasting nature of hurricanes, and the effects it has on the 
devastated areas, Hurricane Matthew was an ideal choice as a natural disaster worth 
addressing in terms of the way the four non-profits communicated. Hurricanes take time 
to develop, cause destruction, and leave an aftermath, dividing the disaster into three 
distinct phases that were analyzed. Additionally, Hurricane Matthew moved from the 
Caribbean Sea up to the Atlantic and Southeastern U.S., causing destructing from place to 
place. This allowed for this research to address crisis phase and location as indicators of 
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potentially different types of crisis communication. Because of this, Hurricane Matthew 
fit with the three crisis phases addressed in Coombs (2015), and also provided 
opportunity to address the potentially different types of communication by the 
organizations during the entirety of the disaster.  
The ARC, The Salvation Army USA, Hope for Haiti, and World Vision Haiti 
Historically, non-profit organizations (NPOs) from around the world have joined 
forces to aid those in need during crises. These efforts include education and 
preparedness techniques, response relief, and communications with the public to help 
survivors of disasters cope with the aftermath as well as to encourage others to participate 
in the cause to send aid to devastated areas following a disaster. Nearly 75 percent of 
support for NPOs comes from individual contributions, and there is a high level of 
competition among them for both public awareness and resources (Sisco, et al., 2010). 
Additionally, this makes relations with the public crucial for NPOs for purposes of 
raising money, volunteers, staff, and supporters in order to fulfill the organization’s 
mission (Sisco, et al., 2010).  
Founded in 1881 by Clara Barton, The ARC is a humanitarian organization led 
and supported by volunteers with a mission to provide relief to victims of disasters and to 
help people prevent, prepare, and respond properly to emergencies (American Red Cross, 
2006). Headquartered in Washington D.C., The ARC is an independent NPO that is 
controlled and operated by Americans in the U.S. (Casey & Rivken, 2005). As of 2014, 
The ARC made nearly three billion dollars in revenue, and on average, 91 cents of every 
dollar goes directly to providing humanitarian aid and relief (American Red Cross, 2006). 
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Part of The ARC’s mission is to ensure fair and equitable treatment for those in need 
(International Red Cross, 2005). Over the last 100 years, The ARC has become a disaster 
relief partner of the Federal Emergency Response Agency (FEMA), with a close 
governmental affiliation and an identifiable and wide-reaching brand (Groscurth, 2011). 
The ARC has been the focus of several controversies over the allocation of funds, making 
it an interesting organization of inquiry in terms of how its response strategies potentially 
addressed its reputation. The New York Times ran several editorial articles pertaining to 
questions of trust and loyalty with The ARC, which have pointed out that The ARC 
represents “all that is right and wrong with the American preference for federal disaster 
response to be carried out by private volunteers rather than government” (Groscurth, 
2011).  
The Salvation Army began in London in 1865 by General William Booth and his 
wife, Catherine, to reach the homeless. The organization made its way to the U.S. in 
1879, when a young Lieutenant, Eliza Shirely, left England and held the first Salvation 
Army meeting in Philadelphia. Headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia, The Salvation 
Army USA provides disaster relief, rehabilitation programs, and food distribution. 
Founded on religious principles, The Salvation Army USA is a part of the Christian 
Church, its mission being to provide outreach, food, clothing, and comfort to those in 
need, particularly those fighting hunger, poverty, or addiction. The Salvation Army USA 
is funded entirely through donations, corporate contributions, and the sale of goods in 
store locations. (The Salvation Army USA, 2017). In 2015, The Salvation Army USA’s 
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revenues reached nearly three million, 30 percent of which went directly to social 
services. 
The ARC and the Salvation Army USA helped thousands of Americans as 
Hurricane Matthew made landfall in the Southeastern U.S. from Florida to New England. 
Both U.S. focused organizations set up shelters up and down the coasts and prepared 
emergency response vehicles with supplies. Prior to landfall, the organizations 
communicated via emergency response services, including Twitter, regarding 
preparedness guidelines. While the death toll in the US as a result of Hurricane Matthew 
did not reach nearly as high of numbers as Haiti, The ARC and The Salvation Army USA 
are still providing relief efforts for areas with severe flooding as a result of the hurricane.  
Due to controversies with The ARC in regards to transparency in the allocation of 
funds, there recently has been a call for organizations with non-governmental 
associations. This has encouraged donors to turn to NPOs assumed to give all donations 
directly to those in need, particularly those that are focused primarily on countries that 
need relief the most. Given The ARC’s history in Haiti, people have pointed donors 
toward organizations whose relief efforts are focused on Haiti, such as Hope for Haiti and 
World Vision Haiti.  
Hope for Haiti is a non-profit organization based out of and founded in Naples, 
Florida in 1990 by JoAnne Kuehner. While the origin is within the U.S., the organization 
itself focuses solely sending and communicating relief efforts directly to Haiti. The 
mission of the organization is to improve the quality of life for the Haitian people and to 
provide emergency relief, such as disaster relief, to this area. For over 25 years, Hope for 
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Haiti has partnered with existing community leaders to overcome challenges of 
community development and nationwide problems, and has sought to meet the needs of 
the Haitian people to improve their quality of life (Hope for Haiti, 2013). As of 2016, 
Hope for Haiti’s revenue was 13 million, with 97 percent of its expenses going toward 
direct services. Both Hope for Haiti and World Vision Haiti are known for providing all 
response and relief efforts directly to those affected in Haiti (Charity Navigator, 2016).  
World Vision Haiti, the local Haiti affiliate of World Vision International, is a 
non-profit that has built partnerships with the people of Haiti to help families affected by 
disaster, poverty, and hunger meet immediate needs. Beginning its work in 1959 at the 
Ebenezer Orphanage with a small group of volunteers, World Vision Haiti went on to 
found a national office in Haiti in 1978 (World Vision International, 2017). World Vision 
International’s 2016 revenue was just over one billion, 83 percent of which goes directly 
to program services. Its mission is to rebuild and create sustainable solutions for the 
future of families and communities in Haiti, particularly following disasters. World 
Vision Haiti responded during and after Hurricane Matthew by providing information, 
supplies, and support to rebuild and recover following the disaster to the people, 
communities, children, and families of Haiti.  
In Haiti, Hope for Haiti and World Vision Haiti provided emergency 
communication and relief, beginning with preventative measures prior to the hurricane’s 
landfall in Haiti and continuing into the present, with relief efforts still ongoing in order 
to restore the affected areas. Both organizations worked with local rescuers and other 
agencies in Haiti to clear roads, set up supply stations and survey the extent of the 
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damage done in Haiti. Given that these organizations focus specifically on Haiti, they 
already had a number of responders located in the country prior to the disaster, some of 
which had already begun participating in relief efforts immediately following the 
announcement of the approaching disaster. The organization continues its efforts to ship 
in supplies and provide relief to the people of Haiti (Stanley, 2016).  
This research looks at the potential similarities and differences in the crisis 
communication response strategies based on the organization and the publics with which 
each organization is communicating over Twitter. While larger, more globally recognized 
non-profits can often run into controversies dealing with transparency, funds, and 
allocation of aid, local charities that focus on a particular country or region are often 
more transparent and rank higher in these areas. These differences offer an opportunity to 
compare the way all four organizations communicated before, during, and after Hurricane 
Matthew to their respective target publics.   
Crisis Communication and Crisis Response Strategies  
 In order to understand crisis communication and response strategies, it is first 
important to understand the components that define a crisis, as well as the consequences 
that events deemed as crises can have on the various players involved. A crisis has been 
defined as “a significant threat to operations that can have negative consequences if not 
handled properly” (Coombs, 2007, pp. 1). Hermann (1963) identified three key 
characteristics that separate a crisis from an unpleasant occurrence: (1) surprise, (2) 
threat, and (3) short response time (Ulmer, et al., 2015). These are necessary conditions 
in determining whether or not an event will be labeled a crisis. Even naturally occurring 
   16 
 
events, such as hurricanes and earthquakes, become crises only if they are unexpected or 
escalate to a level of intensity beyond what is predicted. Additionally, there must be some 
type of threat to the organization, the public, stakeholders, and/or customers in order to 
label an event as a crisis, and the threat must be addressed quickly (Ulmer, et al., 2015). 
Recent research has expanded upon the initial crisis definition, and offered the following 
working definition of organizational crisis:  
An organizational crisis is a specific, unexpected, and non-routine event or series 
of events that create high levels of uncertainty and simultaneously present an 
organization with both opportunities for and threats to its high-priority goals 
(Ulmer, et al., 2015).  
 
Crisis communication is defined as “the collection, processing, and dissemination 
of information required to address a crisis situation” (Coombs, 2010, p. 20). Crisis 
communication research has primarily focused on the study of the interrelationships 
between crisis situations, communication strategies during crises, and the perceptions of 
the public (Schultz, et al., 2011). In general, managing crises, including natural disasters 
has always included a significant communication component in the form of warnings, 
risk messages, evacuation notifications, and information regarding self-efficacy 
(Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). Historically, crisis communication has served as a 
spokesperson and disseminator of information during crises (Seeger, et al., 1998). Crisis 
communication involves the sending and receiving of messages in order to lessen the 
negative outcome of crises and protect organizations, stakeholders or industries from 
damage (Coombs, 1996). Fearn-Banks (2002) suggests that crisis communication is 
verbal, visual and/or written interaction between an organization and its stakeholders, 
prior to, during and after a crisis, and in the case of natural disasters organizations are 
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often communicating during crises to a larger public audience in order to mitigate harm. 
Crisis communication seeks to explain an event, identify possible consequences and 
negative outcomes, and provide information to help reduce harm to affected communities 
in an honest and prompt manner (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005).  
 Although crises develop unpredictably, a certain linear path in their development 
can be perceived and assessed (Palttala, et al., 2012). Crisis communication takes into 
account the developmental stages of a crisis, which have traditionally been broken up into 
five and six stage models (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Moe & Pathranarkul, 2006). The 
simplest model includes a pre-crisis phase, during which preparation occurs, an acute or 
crisis phase, a dramatic event, and a post-crisis phase, when questions on cause, 
responsibility, and preparation for a crisis arise and are addressed by organizations 
(Palttala, et al., 2012; Coombs, 2007). During the pre-crisis phase, communication 
involves preparation and prevention in the wake of a disaster or crisis. When a threat 
erupts into the crisis phase, different communication exigencies and audiences emerge, 
including an immediate threat and compressed timeframe, which requires a more direct 
communicative response (Palttala, et al., 2012). The immediate communication needs 
refer to communication toward people directly affected by the crisis, and the general 
public, to mitigate harm and reduce uncertainty. Often using mass media, the goal is to 
provide information to enhance response appropriateness (Palttala, et al., 2012). Without 
immediate communication during the crisis phase, the level of harm may actually 
increase as people begin to act without the certainty reduction that information-seeking 
provides.  
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 Present-day crises have also affected the institutions that manage communication. 
Initially, governmental actors managed communication, but with new channels to 
communicate to publics, organizations handle much of the crisis communication. This 
requires a great deal of coordination within organizations to communicate effectively 
during crises, and also coordination among the members of the larger response 
organization network (Palttala, et al., 2012). When organizations respond to emergencies 
such as natural disasters, they enter these conversations with the goal of reducing harm to 
those affected, while also providing information to affected areas as well as the public. 
As society turns to social media for crisis information, organizations have also had to use 
these platforms for effective communication with the public. This makes organizations’ 
response strategies over social media of the utmost importance during a crisis, making it 
crucial to understand how the response strategies match the particular disaster.  
Crisis communication research began by focusing on identifying crisis response 
strategies, in response to embarrassment and impression management. Once strategies 
were cultivated, the shift in crisis communication research moved to understanding how 
crisis response strategies should be used (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Crisis response 
strategies are crucial in determining how organizations should respond to disasters. The 
strategies “represent the actual responses an organization uses to address a crisis” 
(Coombs, 2015, pp. 144). Initially, crisis response strategies were used primarily to 
address the potential threat that a crisis and the handling of that crisis has on an 
organization’s reputation. Response strategies have since been adapted to include 
additional crisis types. Crisis response content can be divided into three sequential 
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categories: (1) instructing information, (2) adjusting information, and (3) reputation 
management (Coombs, 2015). Response strategies have continuously evolved over time 
to fit the crisis that occurs, and organizations have used crisis response strategies in order 
to protect their reputation as well as to communicate effectively to the public following 
crises that have a public safety element such as natural disasters.  
Social Media and Crisis Communication  
Natural disasters and other extreme crisis situations require efficient, timely, and 
targeted communication efforts in order to mitigate risk and negative outcomes of such 
events (Spence, et al., 2015). As technology continues to evolve, so too must those who 
use it, particularly those using it as a tool to communicate with mass audiences. The 
media play a key role in diffusing information during a crisis, and concerned publics 
often view television or internet coverage continuously as crises unfold (Ulmer, et al., 
2015). Given that social media has become a primary internet tool for the dissemination 
of information, it becomes increasingly important that organizations are communicating 
effectively over their social media sites. This makes social media communication efforts 
particularly relevant for the field of crisis communication, because of its promise to 
facilitate coordinated communication and response to disasters (Purohit, et al., 2013).  
When crises occur, there is an important issue surrounding social media and the 
creation of crisis communication messages. Social media outlets provide a venue to the 
public to report events in real time. Further, traditional mass media sources utilize 
information from social media sites. Several cases indicate that traditional media acquire 
“backchannel news,” essentially secondhand news, from social media and consider it a 
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legitimate source of information during crises (Sutton, et al., 2008). Backchannel 
communication tools (e.g. social media) allow for dissemination of information that is not 
over traditional media. In this sense, backchannel communication tools provide an 
opportunity for the public to actively create and disseminate information separate from 
traditional media sources (McCarthy & Boyd, 2005). This allows for users of social 
media sites, such as Twitter, to be active consumers and creators of information (Sutton, 
et al., 2008). Organizations and public agencies have increasingly used social media as 
platforms to rapidly share information with the public concerning preparation, coping and 
response, and recovery efforts following a crisis (Spence, et al., 2015). Additionally, 
there are often technology issues related to mass media channels, such as power outages 
and satellite connection problems, which may slow down official news sources, making 
social media outlets even more important as crisis communication tools during a disaster 
(Spence, et al., 2015). During the January 2010 Haitian earthquake, for example, social 
media played a key role in providing the public with information in the absence of 
traditional media outlets, which had been compromised by power outages during the 
quake (Bunz, 2010). What is less known about social media, such as Twitter, is how 
NPOs are using it to provide crisis response strategies.   
Twitter and Crisis Communication 
One of the most widely used social media sources of information is social media, 
such as Twitter (Morris, et al., 2010; Sin & Kim, 2013). Twitter is an online social 
networking and microblogging service. The social media outlet was launched in 2006 and 
rapidly took over mainstream social media during 2008 and 2009. By 2011, the site had 
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accumulated over 300 million users and has continued to grow. This growth suggests that 
Twitter is a medium in which established organizations participate frequently. Twitter 
provides the opportunity for two-way communication, which is the most ethical way to 
conduct public relations (Grunig, 1992). When communications are sent out to the public 
by organizations, the recipients of these messages have the opportunity to respond by 
mobilizing, including directly their own resources toward relief efforts (Purohit, et al., 
2013). Social media itself has evolved to become an interactive and collaborative 
platform for crisis communication, and allows for organizations to communicate directly 
with their designated publics in times of crisis. Twitter provides users the opportunity to 
post a Tweet, read, and respond to text-based messages limited to 140 characters in 
length, creating a multi-media platform with constant updates (Spence, et al., 2015). 
Users can also follow public figures, corporations, and organizations in order to be 
entertained or informed. During crisis situations, such as natural disasters, emergency 
relief response organizations use Twitter to communicate with the public and inform 
affected areas on how to respond.  
 Twitter continues to evolve with changes in technology, and has constantly 
modified and improved its interface for user-friendliness and can be accessed using 
numerous applications for mobile phones, tablets, and computers. This makes it 
especially useful for communicating during crises, when other means such as traditional 
media sites or programs may be unavailable (Spence, et al., 2015). As noted by Thelwall 
& Stuart (2007), emergency communication technologies have a role in communication 
throughout all phases of a crisis situation. Their research speculated that many of the new 
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technologies being used during crises were fulfilling general, rather than personal, needs. 
However, individuals also look to social media to fulfill needs of emotion and 
connectedness following crisis events (Spence, et al., 2015), and social media can often 
provide outlets for information to bring users together to create an online community. 
Both public and private agencies have an important role in creating crisis response 
(Lachlan, et al., 2016), and given the shift toward online platforms for information-
seeking, Twitter was used as the platform for this analysis.  
NPOs and Crisis Communication 
 The near ubiquitous use of social media has enhanced and increased NPOs’ 
communication with stakeholders, volunteers, the media and the public (Waters, 2007). 
Previous research has shown that the public characterizes NPOs are being warm and 
more caring than for-profit corporations, but less competent (Aaker, et al., 2012). In this 
sense, social media provides NPOs with the opportunity to take advantage of the sites in 
order to more effectively communicate and prove their competency to the public, in 
addition to the trust that the public already holds for NPOs over for-profit corporations. 
Through the combination of traditional media channels and social media channels, NPOs 
are able to mobilize stakeholders and volunteers, create meaningful relationships with 
donors, and increase their accountability and trust from the public (Saxton & Guo, 2011).  
 There has been little research in the area of crisis communication over Twitter and 
NPOs. Sisco, et al. (2010) looked at crisis communication of The ARC between 1997-
2007 by analyzing news articles. This research, however, did not account for social media 
communication. The organizational-level Twitter research is sparse, making this a 
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particularly interesting case when looking at the ways the organizations communicated 
over this platform. While there has been some research that has looked at NPOs’ 
communications over Twitter without the aspect of a crisis, it’s focus is general 
communication as opposed to crisis specific. For example, Lovejoy & Saxton (2012) 
looked at NPOs’ communications over Twitter more generally, and found that social 
media has created hope for the organizations’ communications to provide a dialogue that 
opens up two-way communication for an interactive, civil society. Relatedly, Briones, et 
al. (2011) interviewed 40 Red Cross employees and found that there is a potential for 
social media to build relationships between organizations and the public. While there is 
some research on NPOs and communication over social media, the majority of these 
studies do not look at crisis situations specifically. There have not been any previous 
studies that have addressed SCCT in relation to NPOs and their crisis response 
communications over social media. This research looked at NPOs crisis communication 
over Twitter, expanding the literature on NPOs and social media communication in the 
context of Hurricane Matthew.  
Theoretical Framework: Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) seeks to develop 
recommendations for organizations following a crisis. Coombs developed this theory by 
connecting Attribution Theory, which holds that people make judgments about the cause 
of events or crises (Coombs, 2012), and crisis response strategies (Ulmer, et al., 2015; 
Benoit, 1995). SCCT provides a framework for understanding how to respond to crises, 
and guidelines for how organizations should react in order to protect their reputations and 
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inform the public in the wake of a crisis or disaster (Coombs, 2007). The crisis response 
strategies in SCCT, outlined by Coombs (2015), are matched to the nature of the crisis 
and the threat level the crisis has to the organization, or in the case of natural disasters, to 
the public as well. The response strategies match the level of responsibility and aid to 
victims that would be necessary in order to address the crisis and the potential threat or 
damage (Coombs, 2006). The crisis situation is the focal point of SCCT and determines 
the appropriate response strategy. SCCT notes that the potential damage from a crisis is a 
function of crisis responsibility and certain facts set the framework for response strategies 
by an organization (Coombs, 2006). After collapsing and categorizing crisis response 
strategy lists from the previous research of Fearn-Banks (1996), Lerbinger (1997), 
Marcus and Goodman (1991), and Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), Coombs (2015) used 
SCCT to develop a list of identified crisis types and response strategies that match the 
types of crises.  
 Three conditions are used in SCCT in order to address the threat to an 
organization’s reputation during and after a crisis: crisis type, crisis history, and prior 
reputation (Coombs, 2015). Following this classification, organizations and crisis 
communication practitioners can select the matching necessary response strategy to best 
address the crisis type and reputational threat, as well as the public safety threat in the 
case of natural disaster type crises. As previously noted, these factors contribute to the 
categorization of crisis type, which have been organized into clusters. Coombs and 
Holladay (2002) conducted a cluster analysis that groups crisis types into three distinct 
categories, depending upon the crisis responsibility, and therefore the necessary strategy 
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that is required by each different type (Coombs, 2006). The assessment of threat by the 
crisis is a two-step process, in which the team first identifies the crisis type, using a crisis 
frame to evaluate the situation (Coombs, 2004). SCCT specifies 10 crisis types/frames, 
illustrated in Table 1, by level of responsibility, as outlined in Coombs (2015).  
Table 1 
 
Crisis Types/Clusters by Level of Responsibility  
Victim Cluster: Very little attribution of crisis responsibility  
Natural disasters 
Rumors 
Workplace violence 
Malevolence 
Accidental Cluster: Low attribution of crisis responsibility 
Challenges 
Technical-error accidents 
Technical-error product harm 
Preventable Cluster: Strong attributions of crisis responsibility  
Human-error accidents 
Human-error product harm 
Organizational misdeeds 
 
A natural disaster falls under the victim cluster of crisis responsibility, and therefore, 
warrants different response strategies than subsequent clusters and levels of crisis 
responsibility. For natural disasters, there is very little attribution of crisis responsibility, 
meaning that there is a low likelihood that the organization itself will be blamed for the 
crisis type. Because of this, the primary goal of response strategies following a natural 
disaster is to inform the public. 
 SCCT separates instructing information from crisis response strategies. 
Instructing information represents the information that stakeholders and other players 
involved, such as the public, need and want to know after a crisis occurs (Coombs, 2006). 
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There are three types of instructing information: (1) crisis basics, including the basic 
information about what happened, (2) protection, including what those affected need to 
do to protect themselves from harm, and (3) correction, which includes what the 
organization is doing to correct the problem or prevent a repeat of the crisis (Coombs, 
2006; Bergman, 1994; Coombs, 1999; Sturges, 1994). SCCT argues that instructing 
information is necessary following a crisis, and must be provided to those affected. 
Instructing information is a crucial step in the process of crisis response strategies, as the 
organizations must communicate instructive information to those involved, particularly 
stakeholders and the public affected by the crisis. Instructing information is the first of 
the 13 recommendations that Coombs (2015) gives when communicating after a crisis, 
separate from response strategies, which are the actual communication response 
strategies the organizations used over Twitter during the disaster.  
 The second step in SCCT involves assessing the reputational threat and modifying 
response strategies based on crisis history and prior reputation. In the case of The ARC, a 
prior response to the earthquake disaster in Haiti in 2010 set the stage for the current 
crisis and how they responded to the public following Hurricane Matthew. The current 
crisis, Hurricane Matthew, was a much greater reputational threat to the organization, 
given the crisis history and the prior reputation of The ARC in previous crises (Coombs 
& Holladay, 2002). For The Salvation Army USA, Hope for Haiti, and World Vision 
Haiti, the organizational reputations had not been previously compromised in terms of 
responses to crises in Haiti. Therefore, response strategies likely reflect less of an effort 
to address reputation than to address public safety and informing the public. Coombs 
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(2015) acknowledges that the focus within SCCT on the reputation of an organization 
may seem rather shallow in the wake of a crisis, however, the theory itself notes that 
people are the first priority in a crisis (Coombs, 2015). In the SCCT model (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2002), the key variables that control crisis response strategy are personal 
control (organizational control), severity, crisis responsibility, performance history, and 
organizational reputation. It can be noted that the stronger the potential reputational 
damage threat is, the more the crisis response strategy must attempt to accommodate the 
victim(s) (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). The crisis response manager or practitioner, i.e. 
an organization, must match the threat with the appropriate response strategy based on 
the severity and the crisis history, which both contribute to the crisis responsibility and 
therefore the strategies to reduce threat.  
During a crisis, the public expects involved organizations to do more for the 
victim(s) of the crisis when the organization is held more accountable for the crisis 
situation (Coombs, 1995). However, this changes in the case of a natural disaster, 
because the crisis responsibility is low in terms of the organization and the accountability. 
Even so, the public may look to assign blame, thereby leading the responsibility to often 
fall on organizations regardless of the nature of the crisis. The response strategies should 
then attempt to mitigate reputational damage by communicating with the public that the 
organization supports and cares for those affected, and meets the publics’ expectations in 
the way they react and respond to the crisis situation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). 
Coombs (2015) used SCCT to build a list of 10 possible crisis response strategies, falling 
under four distinct postures: (1) Denial posture, (2) Diminishment posture, (3) Rebuilding 
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posture, and (4) Bolstering posture (See Appendix A for full list of response strategies). 
For NPOs specifically, the response strategies that fall under the denial and diminishment 
postures are unlikely to be seen in the data. This is in part due to the fact that NPOs are 
seen as more warm and caring organizations than for-profit corporations (Aaker, et al., 
2012). Therefore, it is unlikely they need to use such strategies when communicating 
with the public, as the public already perceives them as more trusted than corporations. In 
addition, the type of crisis (natural disaster) makes denial or diminishment postures 
highly unlikely.  
While there are 10 possible response strategies, Coombs (2015) also provides a 
list of 13 recommendations for response strategies when a crisis occurs (See Appendix B 
for full list of recommendations). The recommendations, simplified, include: (1) Provide 
instructing information to victims in the form of warnings or directions; (2) Provide 
adjusting information to victims by expressing concern and providing corrective action; 
(3) Use diminishment strategies for accident crises where there is no crisis history or 
unfavorable reputation; (4) Use diminishment strategies for victim crises when there is no 
crisis history or unfavorable reputation; (5) Use rebuilding strategies for accident crises 
when there is a crisis history or unfavorable reputations; (6) Use rebuilding strategies for 
preventable crises; (7) Use denial strategies for rumor crises; (8) Use denial strategies in 
challenges if warranted; (9) Use adjusting information in challenges when stakeholders 
may support the challenge; (10) Use reinforcing strategies as supplemental; (11) Use the 
victimage response strategy with the victim cluster; (12) Do not mix denial strategies 
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with diminishment or rebuilding strategies; and (13) Diminishment and rebuilding 
strategies can be used together.  
 The bulk of SCCT research uses experimental, quantitative content analysis, and 
survey research design in order to address the response strategies that were matched with 
the crisis accounting for the severity of the crisis and the threat to organizations’ 
reputations. Coombs (2004) used an experiment to examine the extent to which 
reputational threat of a victimization or accidental crisis increased when the organization 
had history in this crisis type, and found that there was a weak link between crisis history 
and crisis responsibility, and a strong link between crisis history and reputation of the 
organization (Coombs, 2004). Coombs (2011) employed survey methodology to identify 
if there is a match between crisis responsibility and reputation across all crisis types, and 
found that a moderate correlation existed across all crisis type clusters (Coombs, 2011). 
Coombs (2012) notes that research that assesses crisis situations, such as Coombs and 
Holladay (2001) that tests for a crisis situation model, has relied on basic correlations and 
regression analysis (Coombs, 2012). Other SCCT research includes Claeys, et al. (2010) 
experimental design, which found that reputational perceptions did not vary between the 
accidental and victim crisis types, and that organizations who use rebuilding strategies 
are more favorable than those that use diminishment strategies (Claeys, et al., 2010). 
Studies that have looked at text by organizations have primarily focused on news articles 
or press releases rather than their social media communications. Sisco, et al. (2010) 
conducted a content analysis of news articles about The ARC’s crisis response strategies 
between 1997 and 2007. Their research found that response strategies did not match the 
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recommendations outlined in Coombs’ SCCT, and that if they had, perhaps the 
organization would have fared better in later crises (Sisco, et al., 2010). While this study 
did address NPOs’ communications in the context of SCCT, it only looked at The ARC. 
The current study looked at four different NPOs in order to address potential similarities 
or differences in communicate strategies and recommendations used over Twitter.  
There has not been any previous research that has looked at NPOs’ response 
strategies over Twitter, using SCCT to textually code for possible types of response 
strategies and recommended response strategies from Coombs (2015). Looking at the 
data qualitatively both allows for and requires a deep reflection on the meanings and 
nuances of each and every datum (Saldaña, 2009). Qualitatively coding the Tweets 
promoted total immersion in the dataset, which quantitative content analysis studies in 
this area have not reached. In traditional quantitative content analysis, researchers have 
looked at the frequency of words or items. Saldaña (2009) argues that frequency of 
occurrence, or words or phrases, is not necessarily an indicator of significance in the 
dataset. Qualitative coding does not just count instances of communication, rather it goes 
a step further to understand the nuances of the data through pondering, scrutinizing, and 
interrogating the dataset in order to speculate, connect, and conceptualize what is actually 
happening. Qualitative analysis in this sought to make sense of what was occurring in the 
data (Saldaña, 2009).  
This study aims to investigate what response strategies the organizations were 
using, and if any of the recommended response strategies were used when 
communicating with their respective publics before, during, and after Hurricane 
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Matthew. Given the number of Twitter users and the fact that during crises people often 
receive their information over Twitter, this research intends to look at the ways 
organizations are communicating and responding during crises over Twitter in order to 
both gain insight and provide possible recommendations for future response strategies, 
building off of Schultz, et al. (2011). The first experimental study that addressed the role 
of social media in crisis response strategy and communication, found that in the case of 
crisis communication, the medium was in fact more important than the message (Schultz, 
et al., 2011). This provides warrant for the use of Twitter in this research, as the medium 
has been deemed to be an important factor in determining appropriate crisis 
communication. Jin, et al. (2011) also used experimental design and found that the 
medium choice influenced peoples’ perceptions on how organizations should respond to 
crises (Jin, et al., 2011). Although Schultz, et al. (2011) and Jin, et al. (2011) addressed 
Twitter as a unique medium in crisis communication, their studies were both conducted 
through experimental design, and did not account for the actual messages that 
organizations were putting out to the public. Additionally, with the exception of Sisco, et 
al. (2010), there has not been any prior SCCT research using NPOs rather than for-profit 
corporations. This study was the first study using SCCT to textually code for crisis 
response strategies and recommendations in Tweets by NPOs during a natural disaster 
crisis. This study attempted to fill current research gaps and provide recommendations for 
response strategies over Twitter. Based on the theoretical framework provided by SCCT, 
this study asks:  
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RQ1a: What SCCT crisis communication response strategies did The 
ARC, The Salvation Army USA, Hope for Haiti, and World Vision Haiti 
use during each crisis phase of Hurricane Matthew over Twitter? 
RQ1b: Which, if any, of the 13 response strategy recommendations 
outlined in Coombs (2015) were used by the organizations? 
RQ2: How did the response strategies differ by organization?   
RQ3: How did the organizations’ response strategies differ by the target 
location and public with which they were communicating? 
RQ4: What additional response strategies, if any, were used by each of the 
organizations?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   33 
 
Method 
 Following Saldaña, qualitative coding was chosen as the method to answer the 
research questions in this study. The study involved qualitatively coding Tweets from 
The ARC, The Salvation Army USA, Hope for Haiti, and World Vision Haiti 
organizations, beginning on October 3, 2016, when Hurricane Matthew first appeared on 
weather tracking radar, during the crisis, and until October 31, 2016, when the last tweets 
of the month pertaining to Hurricane Matthew were sent out by the organizations.  
Data Retrieval and Sample  
 Data for this research was collected directly from the organizations’ Twitter pages 
and via the Twitter advanced search function. The initial Twitter data from The ARC and 
Hope for Haiti was collected during the time of Hurricane Matthew, and was accessed 
directly from their respective Twitter pages. After initial data immersion, it was decided 
to include Tweets from The Salvation Army USA and World Vision Haiti to provide a 
more robust data set. Tweets from The Salvation Army USA and World Vision Haiti 
were retrieved using the Twitter advanced search function. The dates of the Tweets 
analyzed for all four organizations began on October 3, 2016, when the first Tweet by 
any of the organizations was put out, and ended on October 31, the last day of the month 
when Hurricane Matthew was being discussed over Twitter. Tweets were organized by 
organization, chronologically. Any Tweets that were not related to Hurricane Matthew 
were removed. There were four Tweets removed from The ARC, no Tweets removed 
from Hope for Haiti, twelve Tweets removed from The Salvation Army USA, and one 
Tweet removed from World Vision Haiti. All additional Tweets dealt with Hurricane 
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Matthew and were analyzed, for a total of 2,963 words and 174 Tweets in the sample. 
This includes 33 Tweets and 525 words by The ARC; 92 Tweets and 1,743 words by The 
Salvation Army USA; 20 Tweets and 316 words by Hope for Haiti; and 29 Tweets and 
379 words by World Vision Haiti.  
Data Analysis 
This research began with a data immersion process, followed by first cycle 
deductive coding using response strategies and response recommendations outlined in 
Coombs (2015). First cycle coding concluded with inductive coding, which sought to 
address additional types of response strategies that the organizations used through their 
Tweets. Second cycle coding was then performed on the additional response strategies to 
collapse the codes. Coding was the most useful method for this study because it allowed 
for thorough inspection into the diversity of the data, and what is being represented in the 
text (Richards & Morse, 2007; Saldaña, 2009).  
 In the first phase of data analysis, the author engaged in data immersion and pre-
coding. The data immersion process allowed for an initial overview of the data to gain 
familiarity with the dataset, and the pre-coding process allowed for the identification of 
initial important information (Boyatzis, 1998; Saldaña, 2009). These steps prepared the 
data for coding by providing familiarity with the contents and initiating some of the first 
steps in the analytic process (Saldaña, 2009). Coombs (2007) divides crisis situations into 
three phases: (1) pre-crisis phase, (2) crisis phase, and (3) post-crisis phase. During pre-
coding, the Tweets were separated into the three phases of crisis communication, to 
understand how each of the organizations were using response strategies during each of 
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the three phases of a crisis. The pre-crisis phase was the shortest phase, and began on 
October 3, 2016, when weather radar began tracking the storm and ended on October 4, 
2016, when Matthew made landfall. The crisis phase lasted from October 5, 2016 until 
October 8, 2016, when the hurricane was deemed post-tropical. The post-crisis phase 
included the aftermath of the hurricane, beginning October 9, 2016 and ending October 
31, 2016. Very little communication by the organizations about Hurricane Matthew has 
occurred after the post-crisis phase time frame analyzed in this research, allowing for 
saturation by the end of analysis.   
 Tweets were coded manually, in place of an electronic coding program, which 
Basit (2003) notes is a choice dependent on the size of the project and expertise of the 
researcher (Saldaña, 2009). Due to the size of the dataset, manual coding was chosen as 
the sole method. Throughout the coding process, codes were colored differently 
depending on which response strategy or recommendation was present. Additionally, 
analytics memos were taken and a codebook was kept in order to reflect on the coding 
process. Past studies have recommended maintaining a reflective journal on the research 
project with extensive analytic memos in order to later go back and reflect on the coding 
process during analysis (Ezzy, 2002; Saldaña, 2009). Following data immersion and pre-
coding on the dataset itself, the codebook was organized into four sections: (1) first cycle 
coding, including deductive coding using the Coombs (2015) possible response strategies 
(2) first cycle coding, including the Coombs (2015) crisis response recommendations, (3) 
first cycle inductive coding, which was inductive coding performed on the dataset that 
looked for additional responses, and (4) second cycle coding, which collapsed the 
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additional response codes. Codes were organized in a sequential order of coding, 
ultimately having the codebook show instances of two of the crisis response strategy 
postures, three of the 10 response strategies in those postures, and instances of four of 13 
response recommendations. The codebook included a description of the code, including 
the name of the code itself, inclusion and exclusion criteria, typical and atypical 
exemplars of the code, and “close, but no”, which are instances in the data that could 
mistakenly be assigned to the code (Saldaña, 2009). Typical and atypical exemplars were 
organized by organization within each code.  
 Next, in first cycle coding, the data was coded deductively using the 10 possible 
strategies (Coombs, 2015) as the framework. The 10 possible response strategies are 
categorized into four postures: (1) Denial posture, which includes attacking the accuser, 
denial, and scapegoating; (2) Diminishment posture, which includes excusing and 
justification; (3) Rebuilding posture, which includes compensation and apology; and (4) 
Bolstering posture, which includes reminding, ingratiation, and victimage. In the 
codebook, the response strategies that occurred in the dataset were labelled with a 
description, inclusion and exclusion criteria, typical and atypical exemplars, and a “close, 
but no” category, which includes examples that almost fit into each of the codes but 
actually belonged elsewhere. For the compensation response strategy, the description 
included Tweets in which the organization communicated about providing money or 
other gifts to the victims of the disaster. This included mentioning monetary or service 
efforts, including mentioning exact figures of donations, number of shelters, and number 
of volunteers. Excluded from this code were reminders to the public of the good work the 
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organizations had done in the past, and mentioning other organizations or companies that 
have also worked to help with relief efforts. The ingratiation code was described as the 
organization praising its stakeholders, or praising those who are a part of the organization 
and are helping in relief efforts. This code included praising of volunteers, donors, and 
those helping outside of the organization but are affiliated with it, but excluded praising 
the organization’s work or mentioning partnerships with other organizations without 
noting their relief efforts. Lastly, victimage was coded and described as when the 
organization explains how it is also a victim of the crisis. Included in this code were 
instances of organizations mentioning that they were “right there with the people,” or 
organizations mentioning members of volunteers of the organization who were being 
effected by the disaster as well. Excluded from this code were instances of organizations 
Tweeting stories about victims outside of the organization, such as showing how a 
particular individual with no organization affiliation was affected.  
First cycle, deductive coding also accounted for the 13 response recommendations 
(Coombs, 2015) to determine which (if any) of the recommendations were taken into 
consideration by the organizations when communicating with their respective publics. 
The recommendation list was reduced from 13 to three after the first analysis of the 10 
response strategies found that only response strategies in the rebuilding and bolstering 
postures appeared during the crisis type of a natural disaster. The three recommendations 
were coded in this phase of data analysis:  
1. Provide instructing information to all victims or potential victims in the form 
of warnings and directions for protecting themselves from harm. 
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2. Provide adjusting information to victims by expressing concern for them and 
providing corrective action when possible.  
3. The victimage response strategy should be used only with the victim cluster. 
The recommendations’ descriptions in the codebook were verbatim from the 
recommendations listed above. The first recommendation, titled instructing information, 
included information about the disaster, how to prepare, how to handle the aftermath, and 
how to rebuild. Not included in this code were instances where the organization mentions 
what they are doing to help or ways to donate or help those in need. In the second 
recommendation, titled adjusting information, examples in the text included expressions 
of concern by the organization, and providing information on how to fix things/make 
things better. Not included in this code were instances of the organization showing how 
they are helping or providing information on the status of the disaster. Codebook criteria 
were used consistently during the coding process of the dataset. Finally, given that the 
crisis type was a natural disaster, which falls under the victim cluster, the appearance of 
codes under the victimage response strategy represented the presence of the last 
recommendation that was used in the dataset. The title of this recommendation was 
shortened to victimage response matched victim cluster.  
First cycle coding concluded with inductive coding, which looked for additional 
communications and responses used in the Tweets by each of the organizations. This 
involved taking a step back from the dataset and looking at it with a fresh focus, without 
looking for specific words, phrases, or codes, as was the case for deductive coding. The 
inductive coding process was also recorded in the codebook, and was coded for through 
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each of the organizations once an additional code was identified. As a result of inductive 
coding, there were 13 additional codes found separate from those that had been 
previously coded for during first cycle coding for response strategies and 
recommendations. The 13 additional codes were: (1) Call for monetary donation (2) Call 
for volunteers, (3) Call for blood donation, (4) Call for instructional help, (5) Updates on 
storm status, (6) Updates on organization’s status, (7) Updates on volunteer status, (8) 
Updates on external relief efforts, (9) Updates on condition after storm, (10) Affected 
communities, (11) Affected individuals, (12) Victim’s actual story, (13) Victim 
responses.  
Second cycle coding collapsed the 13 additional codes into four categories: (1) 
organization’s call for donations, (2) organization’s call for help, (3) informative storm 
and response updates, and (4) victims’ stories. The call for donations category was 
defined as when an organization directly acts for a donation, including monetary 
donations, but excluding volunteers signing up to help. The organization’s call for help 
code was defined as a call to those reading the Tweets to provide help to those in need, 
including asking for help or volunteers, but excluding asking for monetary help and 
donations. The informative storm and response updates were updates on what is going on 
with the hurricane as well as the aftermath, such as flooding updates. This category 
included information about the storm or organizations, and excluded information about 
actual relief efforts. The final additional code category was victims’ stories, which was 
any mention of a specific person or community directly affected by the hurricane, 
including their stories and excluding the stating of facts about the destruction or talking 
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about how the organization helped those victims. For every code in both first and second 
cycle coding, the number of times each code appears in the pre-crisis, crisis, and post 
crisis phases of the organizations’ Tweets was recorded and accounted for in analysis.  
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Results 
  Tweets were coded and analyzed in order to address the research questions 
presented in this study. Research Question 1a asked what response strategies each of the 
four organizations used during each crisis phase of Hurricane Matthew over Twitter. Of 
the four possible postures, response strategies in this dataset fell under the two postures 
of rebuilding and bolstering, including only three of the response strategies: (1) 
compensation, (2) ingratiation, and (3) victimage. In the crisis types/clusters outlined in 
Coombs (2015), natural disasters fall under the victim cluster, which involves very little 
attribution of crisis responsibility. Given that the three response strategies that appeared 
in the data did not involve dealing with crisis responsibility, there was a match between 
the organization’s response strategies and the crisis type. 
The compensation code was described as the organizations’ communications 
about providing money or gifts to the victims of the disaster, and appeared 31 times total 
in the dataset. In The ARC’s Tweets, the compensation code was present nine times, four 
times in the crisis phase and five times in the post-crisis phase. A typical example of this 
code as shown in a Tweet by The ARC is: “#RedCross readies for #HurricaneMatthew 
relief operation, with 100+ shelters preparing to open on the East Coast” (RedCross, 
October 5, 2016). Compensation appeared 15 times in Tweets by The Salvation Army 
USA, including seven times in the crisis phase and eight times in the post-crisis phase. A 
typical example of this code in a Tweet by The Salvation Army USA is: “TSA is 
sheltering 780+ people in #Haiti after #HurricaneMatthew” (SalvationArmyUS, October 
5, 2016). This code appeared two times in the Hope for Haiti Tweets in the crisis phase 
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and post-crisis phase. An atypical example of the compensation code in a Tweet by Hope 
for Haiti is: “Hurricane relief donations will be used for: - Food – Supplies for house 
repairs – Medicine cholera, typhoid – Seeds, farming supplies” (HopeForHaiti, October 
7, 2016). This was an atypical example for the code because there was not a specific 
number or amount mentioned, but it still shows the supplies being used by the 
organization to compensate the victims, and therefore was coded under the compensation 
code. The compensation code was present five times in World Vision Haiti’s Tweets, 
including once in the pre-crisis phase and four times in the post-crisis phase. A typical 
example of this code in World Vision Haiti’s Tweets is: “A week after 
#HurricaneMatthew hit #Haiti our teams have already helped more than 12,000” 
(WorldVision, October 13, 2016).  
 Within the bolstering posture, the ingratiation and victimage response strategies 
appeared in the data 20 times and 12 times total, respectively. Ingratiation was described 
as the organization praising stakeholders or praising those who are a part of the 
organization who are helping relief efforts. In The ARC’s Tweets, the code appeared four 
times, including once in the crisis phase and three times in the post-crisis phase. A typical 
example of the ingratiation code in The ARC’s Tweets is: “A special thanks to our 
partners & their customers for supporting #HurricaneMatthew relief!” (RedCross, 
October 21, 2016). Ingratiation was present 11 times in The Salvation Army USA’s 
Tweets, including three times in the crisis phase and eight times in the post-crisis phase. 
A typical example of this code in The Salvation Army USA’s Tweets is: “We’re blessed 
to have millions of volunteers who make such a difference in the lives of those we serve” 
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(SalvationArmyUS, October 27, 2016). In Hope for Haiti’s Tweets, the ingratiation code 
appeared three times in the post-crisis phase. A typical example of this is: “Sending 
special social media gratitude to SO MANY donors and fundraisers in the wake of 
#HurricaneMatthew!” (HopeForHaiti, October 23, 2016). Finally, the ingratiation code 
appeared twice in World Vision Haiti’s Tweets, in the pre-crisis and post-crisis phases. 
An atypical example of this code in World Vision Haiti’s Tweets is: “Our staff in #Haiti 
are working around the clock to prepare for #HurrianeMatthew and its expected impact” 
(WorldVision, October 3, 2016). This was considered an atypical example because it 
does not directly thank the staff, but it still shows that the organization is appreciative of 
the efforts they are making in Haiti.  
 The victimage response strategy was described as the organization explaining 
how it is also a victim of the crisis, essentially a “we’re right there with you” statement. 
The ARC did not use this response strategy. In The Salvation Army USA’s Tweets, the 
victimage code appeared seven times, including five times in the crisis phase and twice in 
the post-crisis phase. A typical example of this code from the organization’s Tweets is: 
“The #SalvationArmy is safe, hunkered down and serving as #HurricaneMatthew passes” 
(SalvationArmyUS, October 8, 2016). The victimage code was present once in Hope for 
Haiti’s Tweets in the post-crisis phase. A typical example of this code is: “Our school, 
church, clinic are still standing. Our people are resilient […]” (HopeForHaiti, October 20, 
2016). Finally, the victimage code appeared four times in World Vision Haiti’s Tweets, 
twice in the pre-crisis phase and twice in the crisis phase. A typical example of this code 
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is: “Our staff are hunkered down waiting for the #hurricane to pass” (WorldVision, 
October 4, 2016).  
 Research Question 1b asked if the organizations used any of the 13 response 
strategy recommendations outlined in Coombs (2015). As noted in the methods section, 
there were three of these recommendations present in the data, of which the 
recommendations’ titles for coding were: (1) instructing information, (2) adjusting 
information, and (3) victimage strategy matches victim cluster.  
 Instructing information was described as providing instructing information to all 
victims or potential victims in the form of warning and directions for protecting 
themselves from harm, and appeared in the dataset a total of 19 times. This coded 
recommendation appeared five times in the dataset, including three times in the pre-crisis 
phase and twice in the crisis phase. A typical of example of instructing information is: 
“We are monitoring #HurricaneMatthew for any potential US impacts. Be prepare w/ 
these hurricane prep tips: http://rdcrss.org/2d9op1u” (RedCross, October 3, 2016). This 
code appeared in The Salvation Army USA’s Tweets eight times, including once in each 
of the pre-crisis and crisis phases, and six times in the post-crisis phase. An atypical 
example of this code is: “Main bridge to affected areas of #Haiti destroyed by 
#HurricaneMatthew” (SalvationArmyUS, October 5, 2016). While it does not provide the 
audience with instructions on what to do, it does provide them with a warning that the 
bridge has been destroyed. Hope for Haiti did not use this recommendation. In World 
Vision Haiti’s Tweets, instructing information appeared six times, including three times 
in the pre-crisis phase, twice in the crisis phase, and once in the post-crisis phase. 
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Another atypical example of this in World Vision Haiti’s Tweets is: “A death toll from 
#HurricaneMatthew in #Haiti continues to rise, water and shelter top concerns for 
displaced” (WorldVision, October 7, 2016). This is atypical because it again does not 
necessarily provide steps or tips on response, but it does let the audience know the top 
concerns for relief efforts.  
 Adjusting information was described as providing adjusting information to 
victims by expressing concern for them and providing corrective action when possible, 
and appeared in the dataset a total of 17 times. The ARC used this recommendation once 
in the post-crisis phase, an atypical example of it being: “’Time has a way of healing’ 
things. Neighborhoods recover after #HurricaneMatthew” (RedCross, October 25, 2016). 
While it does not directly express concern, the quote in the beginning of the Tweet shows 
that the organization is right there with the people. In The Salvation Army USA’s 
Tweets, adjusting information appeared 13 times, including twice in the pre-crisis phase, 
four times in the crisis phase, and seven times in the post-crisis phase. A typical example 
of this code is: “We’re praying for our friends in the Caribbean as they experience 
devastating weather” (SalvationArmyUS, October 4, 2016). Hope for Haiti used the 
adjusting information recommendation twice in the post-crisis phase, an example of this 
being: “Love and support for Haiti keep pouring in” (HopeForHaiti, October 17, 2016). 
World Vision Haiti used this recommendation once in the post-crisis phase. A typical 
example of this is: “It will take #Haiti a long time to recover from the effects of 
#HurricaneMatthew” (WorldVision, October 21, 2016).   
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Research Question 2 asked how the response strategies differed by organization. 
There were a small number of differences in the crisis response strategies. First, The 
ARC and The Salvation Army USA used the compensation response strategy more 
frequently than Hope for Haiti and World Vision Haiti. The Salvation Army USA used 
this strategy a total of 15 times, while The ARC used it nine times, Hope for Haiti used it 
two times, and World Vision Haiti used it five times. Additionally, The Salvation Army 
USA had the highest frequency of the ingratiation response strategy, while the other three 
organizations did not have significant differences in their frequency of using this 
particular strategy. The Salvation Army USA used ingratiation 11 times, The ARC used 
it four times, Hope for Haiti used it three times, and World Vision Haiti used it twice. 
Nearly all the responses using the ingratiation strategy, across all four organizations, 
occurred in the post-crisis phase: 15 times out of the total 20 times the code was used. For 
the victimage response strategy, The Salvation Army USA is again in the lead for number 
of times the strategy was used. The ARC did not use this response strategy, Hope for 
Haiti used it once and World Vision Haiti used it four times. The Salvation Army USA 
also had a much greater number of Tweets across all phases of the crisis, with 92 Tweets, 
followed by The ARC with 33 Tweets, World Vision Haiti with 29 Tweets, and Hope for 
Haiti with 20 Tweets.  
 Research Question 3 asked how the organizations’ response strategies differ by 
the target location and public with which they were communicating. As noted in the 
literature review, The ARC and The Salvation Army USA’s relief efforts focus primarily 
on the U.S., while Hope for Haiti and World Vision Haiti focus primarily on Haiti. Data 
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immersion and pre-coding revealed that nearly all relief efforts of The ARC and The 
Salvation Army USA were, in fact, focused on the U.S. only, while the relief efforts of 
Hope for Haiti and World Vision Haiti were focused on Haiti only. In The Salvation 
Army USA’s Tweets that were coded as the additional response strategy of the 
organization’s call for donations, the organization called for donations in Haiti and the 
Caribbean. This happened four times in The Salvation Army USA’s Tweets, and was the 
only code in the U.S. focused organizations’ Tweets that addressed relief outside the U.S. 
The only significant difference between the U.S. focused organizations’ response 
strategies and the Haiti organizations’ response strategies was in the use of the 
compensation response strategy. The U.S. focused organizations, The ARC and The 
Salvation Army USA, used compensation a greater amount than the Haiti focused 
organizations, Hope for Haiti and World Vision Haiti.  
 Research Question 4 asked what additional response strategies were present in the 
Tweets by each of the organizations. As noted in the methods section, there were a total 
of 13 additional codes that appeared in the dataset, that were then collapsed into four 
categories: (1) organization’s call for donations, (2) organization’s call for help, (3) 
informative storm and response updates, and (4) victims’ stories.  
 The organization’s call for donations response was described as when an 
organization directly asks for a monetary donation from outside of the organization, and 
appeared a total of 20 times in the dataset. The ARC used this response once in the post-
crisis phase, a typical example of this being: “To help people affected by Hurricane 
Matthew, please text the word MATTHEW to 90999 to make a $10 donation” 
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(RedCross, October 9, 2016). This code appeared 18 times in The Salvation Army USA’s 
Tweets, including twice in the pre-crisis phase, 12 times in the crisis phase, and four 
times in the post-crisis phase. A typical example of this code is: “Please donate to TSA’s 
relief efforts: http://salar.my/Matthew” (SalvationArmyUS, October 5, 2016). Hope for 
Haiti used this response once in the crisis phase. A typical example is: “Many of you 
have been asking if you can donate – the answer is YES and THANK YOU (Check 
“Hurricane Relief Fund”)” (HopeForHaiti, October 7, 2016). World Vision Haiti did not 
use the call for donations response in its Tweets.  
 The organization’s call for help response was described as a call to the public to 
provide help to those in need and those affected by the hurricane. This code appeared a 
total of 23 times in the dataset. The ARC used this response three times in the post-crisis 
phase. An atypical example of this code in The ARC’s Tweets is: “Please #GiveNow. 
http://www.redcrossblood.org/” (RedCross, October 11, 2016). This is an atypical 
example because it still asks for the public to give, but the organization is asking for 
blood donations rather than monetary donations, causing it to fall under the call for help 
response. The Salvation Army USA used this response 18 times, including seven times in 
the crisis phase and 11 times in the post-crisis phase. A typical example of this is: 
“Here’s how to help the people of Haiti affected by Hurricane Matthew – 
http://salar.my/PkYv5N via @weatherchannel” (SalvationArmyUS, October 6, 2016). 
Hope for Haiti used the call for help response once in the pre-crisis phase, in Tweet 
asking for volunteers: “Send support to Haiti after #HurricaneMatthew” (HopeForHaiti, 
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October 4, 2016). World Vision Haiti used this response once in the post-crisis phase by 
Tweeting “Much more help is needed” (WorldVision, October 13, 2016).  
 The informative storm and response updates code was described as informative 
updates on what is actually going on with the hurricane, the aftermath, and the response 
teams. This code appeared a total of 20 times in the organizations’ Tweets. The ARC 
used this response twice in the post-crisis phase. A typical example of this is: 
“#WeatherRed updates from North Carolina, where #HurricaneMatthew brought the 
worst flooding since Hurricane Floyd in 1999” (RedCross, October 17, 2016). The 
Salvation Army USA used this response 10 times, including once in the pre-crisis phase, 
four times in the crisis phase, and five times in the post-crisis phase. An example of this 
as it appears in The Salvation Army USA’s Tweets is: “#HurricaneMatthew impacts FL, 
GA & the Carolinas” (SalvationArmyUS, October 6, 2016). This code appeared six times 
in Hope for Haiti’s Tweets, including twice in the pre-crisis phase and four times in the 
post-crisis phase. An atypical example is: “Last week faculty, staff, students of 
@campbelledu raised more than $6,500! #HopeForHaitiHumpDay” (HopeForHaiti, 
October 17, 2016). While this Tweet mentions an amount of money, it is not talking 
about a monetary amount the organization has given, but rather it is informing the public 
about the amount of money a group outside the organization has raised for relief efforts. 
Therefore, it was coded as informative storm and response updates. World Vision Haiti 
used the informative storm and response updates code twice in their Tweets, once in the 
pre-crisis phase and once in the crisis phase. A typical example of this is: “Our 
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assessments show thousands of houses destroyed or damaged” (WorldVision, October 6, 
2016).  
 The victims’ stories response was described as any mention of a specific person 
or community who was directly affected by the hurricane, and appeared a total of seven 
times in the dataset. The ARC used this response once in the crisis phase, an atypical 
example being: “‘This is our reality.’ Florida residents like Richard find refuge in Red 
Cross shelters #Matthew” (RedCross, October 7, 2016). This is atypical because it 
mentions Red Cross shelters, however, it is doing so as part of a victim’s story, and 
therefore was still coded under victims’ stories. The Salvation Army USA used this 
response four times in the post-crisis phase. A typical example of this code is: “Jerry was 
one of those evacuated by bus from our Fayetteville shelter when it started to flood. […]” 
(SalvationArmyUS, October 17, 2016). Hope for Haiti did not use the victims’ stories 
response in any of its Tweets. World Vision Haiti used this response twice, including 
once in the crisis phase and once in the post-crisis phase. A typical example of this code 
is: “In the new #video Dolphine, 13, tells how #HurricaneMatthew destroyed her home & 
washed away her belongings” (WorldVision, October 14, 2016).  
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Discussion 
This study contributes to the growing body of literature examining crisis 
communication theory and public relations. Sisco, et al. (2010) drew the conclusion that 
public relations theory does (or at least should) inform practice (Sisco, et al., 2010). 
SCCT is a crisis communication theory, that uses a public relations lens to interrogate 
crisis communication. The findings in this research indicate a potential disconnect 
between theory and practice. The results of this study expand our understanding of SCCT 
in three ways. First, Twitter as an emerging platform in the field of crisis communication, 
is still underdeveloped. Organizations have yet to take full advantage of the unique 
channel Twitter provides for crisis communication. Second, the vast majority of SCCT 
research and application has focused on for-profit corporations. The data from this study 
show that there is something different happening with crisis responses when non-profit 
organizations are communicating. And third, SCCT makes assumptions about target 
audience. The results of this study show that the organizations’ Twitter audience is much 
broader than the organizations may have accounted for when preparing their response 
strategies. This discussion will first interpret the results of this research by addressing the 
three main contributions it makes to the field. Then, it will assess the implications of the 
study on crisis communication theory and practice. Next, it will address limitations of the 
current study, and lastly it will suggest recommendations for future research in this field. 
First, the results of this study contribute to an understanding of Twitter as an 
emerging platform in crisis communication, with much room for development and 
improvement. Prior research on Twitter has opened up great possibilities for 
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collaboration and organizational communication (Lovejoy & Saxton, 2012). The little 
research that does exist on social media communications and NPOs (Bortree & Seltzer, 
2009; Greenberg & MacAulay, 2009; Waters, 2007) suggests that Twitter for 
informational uses in further interactivity and dialogue with followers seems to be lost on 
crisis communication practitioners in NPOs. Twitter also has the potential to serve as 
“backchannel” news, to act with traditional media in order to reach a wider audience 
(Sutton, et al., 2008). However, the organizations do not appear to be providing enough 
information in order to fulfill this social media goal. The data show that Twitter may not 
be well developed in crisis communication, both in lack of adjustment in response 
strategies across each of the three crisis phases, as well as strategies and 
recommendations used by the organizations. The crisis phase did not appear to be taken 
into consideration by the organizations, as the response strategies used did not differ by 
crisis phase. One possible explanation for this could be the immediacy of Twitter and the 
way information is disseminated over this channel. Given that natural disaster crises 
require timely and targeted communication efforts (Spence, et al., 2015), information is 
likely provided to the public as it becomes available to the organizations. The push for 
immediate information leaves little time for organizations to adjust their response 
strategies to fit with each crisis phase. Twitter may also provide a unique outlet for the 
dissemination of information in a continuous stream. This suggests that the division of 
response strategies by crisis phase may be obsolete when organizations are using Twitter 
to communicate.  
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Organizations have yet to take full advantage of the unique channel Twitter 
provides for crisis communication. Prior studies (Kent, et al., 2003; Saxton, et al., 2007) 
have shown that NPOs have previously not been able to use websites as effectively as 
they should be regarding crisis communication (Lovejoy & Saxton, 2012). This may be 
because practitioners did not know how to use the platforms. However, with the 
prominence of social media sites now, such as Twitter, there is no longer an excuse to be 
unable to communicate over these platforms (Lovejoy & Saxton, 2012). Therefore, it is a 
responsibility for NPOs to take advantage of Twitter as a platform for disseminating 
crisis communication information, in order to effectively communicate with stakeholders, 
donors, and the public. Twitter is an interesting platform since social media has become a 
natural part of the search for information during crises (Coombs, 2015). Although 
instructing information is the first of the 13 crisis response strategy recommendations 
(Coombs, 2015), it only appeared a total of 19 times in the Tw eets across all four 
organizations. Social media resources, such as Twitter, are expected to address the void 
of information during crises (Ulmer, et al., 2015), yet the organizations’ Tweets provided 
very little instructing information to address this void. This raises the question of how 
organizations are intending to use Twitter during crises, and if they are missing the 
opportunity to provide timely instructing information to those affected. Organizations 
seem to still be trying to learn how to communicate over Twitter, and could be limited by 
the immediacy factor on Twitter, or even by the small number of allotted characters in 
each Tweet. During crises, social media sites promise to facilitate coordinated 
communication (Purohit, et al., 2013), yet the organizations all lacked in their abilities to 
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provide a substantial amount of instructing information on how to act appropriately 
during the crisis. Perhaps the response strategies and recommendations in SCCT are not 
seamlessly transferrable to Twitter, and new communication strategies are required in 
order for organizations to use this outlet to its fullest potential.  
Twitter allows for immediate and constant communication, and for information to 
spread quickly to a large audience. This is especially important when crises like natural 
disasters occur, because those affected are in need of immediate and continuous 
information in order to understand how to act accordingly. Furthermore, when an 
unpredictable crisis occurs, people seek out information to reduce fear and uncertainty 
(Brashers, et al., 2000). Twitter gives organizations the ability to provide quick and 
constant information to reduce uncertainty and fear and to guide people’s behaviors so as 
to reduce harm during the situation. While SCCT recommends providing instructing 
information first (Coombs, 2015), NPOs must also consider other important information 
they have to communicate to the public during crises. This brings the discussion to the 
second important contribution to SCCT that the findings of this study make, which deals 
with the type of organizations being analyzed. The vast majority of SCCT research has 
focused on and been developed around the study of for-profit corporations. With the 
exception of research by Sisco, et al. (2010) that used news articles to look at The ARC’s 
crisis response strategies, there have been no previous studies that have used SCCT to 
look at NPOs’ response strategies.  
The data show that NPOs are inherently different than for-profit corporations in 
their crisis response strategies and communications, particularly over Twitter. This 
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difference can perhaps be explained by the fundamental differences between the 
organizations, in that corporations do not require the donations that NPOs require in order 
to continue funding relief efforts. Given that nearly 75 percent of support for NPOs 
comes from contributions and donations (Sisco, et al., 2010), NPOs’ communications 
regarding information on donating comes to the forefront of the organizations’ priorities. 
NPOs are able to provide relief through their donations, which expands upon the purpose 
and content of instructing information for these organizations. During crises, the people 
are the first priority, so instructing information should be the first information the public 
receives (Coombs, 2015). In the case of for-profit corporations, instructing information 
consists of informing stakeholders or those directly affected by the crisis on ways to 
mitigate harm. People need to know the what, when, where, why and how of a crisis 
(Ammerman, 1995) to create a basic understanding of what happened so those affected 
may act appropriately (Palttala, et al., 2012). In the case of non-profit organizations, 
however, one potential reason why little instructing information was provided could be 
due to the very nature of the organizations and the way they receive funding. However, 
this is perhaps a missed opportunity for NPOs in relation to their missions, which are 
often first and foremost to serve the people. If they are not providing people with 
information to help them understand what is occurring during a crisis, it can be argued 
that they are not completely fulfilling their mission of serving the public’s needs. The 
organizations appear to have prioritized information about donations over instructing 
information, and while donations are necessary in order to serve the people, so is 
information on how the people should react to a crisis.  
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SCCT says that when a crisis hits, both stakeholders and the people need to know 
if there is anything they need to do in order to protect themselves physically (Coombs, 
2015). Additionally, people want to know what is being done to prevent another crisis 
like this from happening. In the case of natural disasters, this becomes tricky, given that 
this crisis type is not a preventable crisis. However, adjusting information, the second 
recommendation (Coombs, 2015), becomes important here. This information must be 
used to show how the organizations are taking action during a crisis. This action, to 
control the crisis situation, is called corrective action, and is a facet of adjusting 
information. Corrective action reduces psychological stress by reassuring people that 
safety is a priority (Sellnow, et al., 1998). Corporations use this strategy to assure 
stakeholders that they are doing what they can to prevent harm from the crisis, and also to 
assure that they are protecting the safety of the people. While corporations try to protect 
stakeholders and those directly affected when a crisis occurs, NPOs must also protect 
their ability to provide relief efforts, which would include assuring they are sufficiently 
funded. Without donations, NPOs are unable to serve the people, often the largest part of 
their missions. Although serving the people includes providing them with physical relief 
such as shelters and supplies, it should also include providing them with instructing and 
adjusting information. Therefore, it appears that instructing information takes on a 
different form as a SCCT recommendation for NPOs’ response strategies. There are two 
facets to instructing information in the case of NPOs, and a balance of both is necessary 
in order to effectively communicate and serve the people. The data would suggest that 
SCCT crisis response strategies were not designed for NPOs, but rather for for-profit 
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corporations in order to communicate with stakeholders. Adjustments should be made to 
SCCT response strategies and recommendations to fit with the priorities of NPOs’ 
communications.  
Although the need for donations is a possible explanation of the differences in the 
ways corporations and NPOs communicated, the discrepancy in response strategies and 
recommendations used is still particularly problematic. In addition to information about 
donating in order to receive sufficient funding, NPOs also have a responsibility to 
provide instructing and adjusting information in order to meet their publics’ needs. NPOs 
are a trusted source of relief and information, and are often the first type of organization 
that the public turns to when a crisis occurs. NPOs are viewed as less competent than 
corporations (Aaker, et al., 2012), so have a responsibility to increase their competence 
during crises and communicate effectively because the public often turns to these 
organizations rather than corporations in times of need. The majority of the public puts 
more trust in NPOs than corporations (Edelman, 2017), particularly in terms of the 
allocation of funds and resources. In 2017, The Edelman Trust Barometer showed that 
the mass population rejects established authority. This includes corporations and 
government, which would imply that a large portion of the population may turn to NPOs 
for information during a crisis. Also, 51 percent of those who distrust the current system, 
believe NPOs are the most trustworthy organizations (Edelman, 2017). Given that a 
higher percentage of people put their trust in NPOs before corporations, it is imperative 
that NPOs are communicating effectively with the public during crises. People are far 
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more likely and able to donate to a non-profit cause than they are to donate to a 
corporation.  
Since the public is not receiving instructing or adjusting information from 
corporations, they reach out to NPOs in hopes of receiving information on what to do 
during a crisis. If neither corporations nor NPOs are providing a sufficient amount of 
instructing and adjusting information, there arises an issue in terms of where the public 
can go to seek this necessary information. This not only could harm the reputations of the 
organizations, but could also lead to greater harm and risk to public safety during natural 
disasters. Although the data show inherent differences in NPOs and corporations in their 
expected response strategies, part of a NPO’s mission is to fill in those gaps in corporate 
communication. NPOs have the opportunity, and even the responsibility, to serve the 
public as well as those affected by a natural disaster. Often times, this is the very premise 
on which these organizations are founded. It is concerning and problematic that these 
four NPOs virtually ignored their responsibility to provide a sufficient amount of 
instructing information, and appeared to solely focus on instructing information for 
providing donations. NPOs should balance the information they provide the public to 
include both information about donations, as well as instructing and adjusting 
information. This also shows why there is perhaps a disconnect in SCCT response 
strategy recommendations, designed for corporations, and NPOs’ communications. This 
warrants adjustments in the SCCT response strategies and recommendations in terms of 
how for-profit corporations and NPOs should be communicating differently during crises. 
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This is essential given that NPOs should be providing the information that corporations 
are not, because a majority of people are putting their trust in NPOs during crises. 
This brings the discussion to the third key finding, which expands understanding 
of SCCT. In SCCT, part of forming a response strategy involves considering the target 
audience (Coombs, 2015). SCCT has assumptions about who the audience is; In the case 
of corporations, this would include the stakeholders and those directly affected by the 
crisis. The data, however, is showing that there may be a broader audience to account for 
over Twitter. Given that the four organizations are NPOs, they are not solely attempting 
to communicate with their respective stakeholders. There was little difference in the 
response strategies of the four organizations based on the target publics and locations. 
This could be because the NPOs are trying to reach a wider audience, beyond those 
directly affected by the crisis. This makes the target audience a less important 
consideration for NPOs than SCCT assumes it is for corporations.  
There are two possible explanations for the lack of difference in response 
strategies based on location of the target audiences. First, this could again have 
something to do with the goals of NPOs’ communications, one of the priorities being to 
raise donations to fund relief efforts. For corporations, communicating with their 
stakeholders does not need to involve asking for donations. For NPOs, however, keeping 
communication open to all audiences allows for information about where and how to 
donate to reach a wider audience. It can be assumed that NPOs are not attempting to only 
receive donations from one specific location, but want to reach the largest number of 
people possible to increase funds to go toward relief efforts. By not only communicating 
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with one target audience, NPOs are better able to collect donations from the broader 
audience that Twitter provides. Although the organizations’ target locations of relief 
differ, they all have the same mission to provide relief to the people. Perhaps the target 
audience becomes less important when the missions of the organizations are the same. 
Additionally, even though the organizations had respective locations of relief, all four of 
the organizations’ communications over Twitter were in English only. This could mean 
that the organizations are in fact trying to reach donors as their primary audiences, and 
could perhaps be why there was a lack of instructing information about the storm. The 
organizations were not intending to communicate directly with the people of Haiti, or 
those affected by the storm, but were rather trying to reach out to donors regardless of 
location. The second possible explanation could have something to do with Twitter as the 
platform analyzed in this study. Perhaps given the vastness of Twitter audiences and the 
expected immediacy of Tweets, the organizations were attempting to communicate with 
anyone involved to get their message out there as soon as possible. This may not only 
have been for donation information, but could also have been to provide informative 
storm and response updates to all audiences. This was possibly in order to include all 
people in the priority of public safety, regardless of location. Given that all four 
organizations were responding to not only the same crisis, but also the same crisis type, 
there was little difference in response strategies based on the target publics.   
The findings in this research present opportunity for development in terms of how 
NPOs in particular are using Twitter as a communication tool during crises. The results 
of this study advance our understanding of SCCT in the context of Twitter as an 
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emerging platform in crisis communication, NPOs as a unique type of organization, and 
the broadness of the audience with which the organizations were communicating. The 
first section of this discussion has shown that Twitter can and should be used as a unique 
tool for immediate and wide-reaching communication during crises. With more 
development, and perhaps training, organizations will better be able to take advantage of 
what the platform has to offer. This includes better incorporating crisis response 
strategies and recommendations into their communications. Additionally, this study 
found that there are important differences between corporations, which are the primary 
focus of SCCT response strategies, and NPOs, which were the focus of this research. 
These differences need to be considered in response strategy recommendations, and 
adjustments should be made in order to better serve the audiences with which NPOs are 
communicating. Finally, Twitter provides the opportunity for organizations to reach a 
broader audience. The data show that the target audience was not as strongly considered 
as expected, which shows how far-reaching Twitter goes in terms of audience. This also 
reveals the potential for organizations to reach a broader audience again in future crises, 
in order to both disseminate information about the crisis or to fund their relief efforts 
through donation communications.  
Implications 
 This study identified how four NPOs communicated via Twitter during Hurricane 
Matthew. Given that publics are increasingly turning to social media, particularly Twitter, 
as a widely used source of information (Morris, et al., 2010; Sin & Kim, 2013), it is 
important that organizations realize the opportunity and potentially the responsibility they 
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have to communicate effectively on these sites. A unique characteristic of Twitter is its 
ability to provide immediate information to a broad audience. While the organizations 
provided a lot of information about storm and response updates, and how to help or 
donate, there was little instructing information communicated to the public. This is 
problematic, and should be taken into consideration when addressing future crises. 
Without instructing information, those affected do not know what to do, creating 
uncertainty. Delivering the necessary information to the public to help them react to a 
disaster, has the potential to save lives by providing them with guidance on how to stay 
safe. Although the SCCT recommendations are geared toward corporations, Coombs 
(2015) does not limit the use of the strategies and recommendations to corporations 
exclusively. This means that instructing and adjusting information should still be top 
priorities in response strategies by organizations over social media, and that other 
strategies and recommendations are still able to be used by NPOs in addition to 
corporations. Perhaps SCCT recommendations need to be adjusted to fit with the 
emerging medium of Twitter, in order to serve the needs of both NPOs as well as the 
public with which they are communicating.  
 The findings in this research show that NPOs are not communicating as 
prescribed in the SCCT. Given that SCCT has primarily focused on corporations, there 
were a number of areas in the response recommendations that the NPOs fell short in their 
Tweets. That being said, perhaps the SCCT response recommendations are not suitable 
for the goals of NPOs. Corporations are attempting to reduce harm to stakeholders, yet 
this data showed that NPOs are most frequently providing updates on the storm and 
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response efforts, as well as discussing donations. This would indicate a disconnect 
between SCCT response strategies and recommendations for NPOs’ communications. 
Again, adjusting the response strategies and recommendations to account for the unique 
ways that NPOs communicate to the public would allow for better crisis communication 
during disasters. It can also be a consideration to develop a list of response strategies and 
recommendations for NPOs specifically, in order to best serve their unique needs as 
organizations and their missions and goals to serve the public.  
 Another discrepancy that appears in the data is in the target audience of 
organizations’ response strategies over Twitter. In the case of NPOs, greater 
consideration needs to be given to who the target audience is, if there even is one. Twitter 
provides a far-reaching audience, which could help NPOs reach a wider range of people 
seeking information on how to stay safe or how to donate. By expanding their response 
strategies, as well as their target audiences, NPOs can more effectively provide relief to 
the public. While corporations target their communications to their stakeholders, it 
appears that NPOs’ target audiences are much broader. This provides NPOs with a 
unique opportunity to communicate more effectively over Twitter, adjust their response 
strategies to serve their non-profit needs, and use Twitter as a way to reach a broader 
audience.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 While this research yielded important findings to the field of crisis 
communication, there were several limitations which can be directions for future 
research. First, the dataset was limited in size and scope due to the fact that each 
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organization only posts a certain number of Tweets. A dataset inclusive of more Tweets 
and organizations may yield additional findings. Organizations that varied more in their 
target public or their work and relief efforts could have provided a better comparison in 
terms of how response strategies differed across the organizations. Second, while this 
research looked at Twitter specifically, more data from news stories, press releases, or 
statements by the organizations could have perhaps filled in some of the gaps in missing 
response strategies and recommendations from the organizations’ Tweets. Since Twitter 
is still considered an emerging platform, perhaps organizations are not yet using it to its 
full potential for crisis communications. Looking at other channels of crisis response by 
the organizations, may show different response strategies and recommendations being 
used on these platforms than on Twitter. Additionally, future research should look more 
closely at the organizations and their intentions in their crisis response strategies. 
Knowing who the organizations’ target publics are and the goals of their communication 
messages would be beneficial in understanding how closely the response strategies 
matched the target audiences’ needs in the wake of the crisis.  
A final limitation is that this research did not include public replies, retweets, or 
favorites. Future research that includes these Twitter features would provide 
understanding into the way Twitter facilitates two-way communication. This is important 
to look at because two-way communication is the most ethical way to conduct public 
relations (Grunig, 1992). Looking at how this plays out between organizations and their 
Twitter audiences would make for a better understanding of the effectiveness of response 
strategies over this platform. This would allow for the researcher to understand how the 
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response strategies are being received by the public, and in turn how the organizations are 
responding to those replies. This would be the next step in determining how helpful the 
crisis response strategies are in providing the public with necessary information and 
strategies. Additionally, this could perhaps shed more light on the establishment of 
community over social media. Looking at replies could show if communities are forming 
over Twitter as a result of communications about the crisis. Given that Twitter allows for 
and encourages this type of communication, it also provides a unique opportunity for 
organizations to act as facilitators in fulfilling the emotional connectedness and 
community needs that are often important following crisis events (Spence, et al., 2015). 
In terms of the dissemination of the two-way communication over Twitter, hashtags, 
which increase searchability and spreadability of messages of Twitter, should also be 
addressed. Tracing the path of hashtags that were included in Tweets by the organization 
could show how the information is being received and spread by the public, including 
replies to the organizations’ Tweets and hashtags directly.  
 This research showed an apparent disconnect between crisis communication 
theory and actual output by NPOs over Twitter. Future research should look at potential 
disconnects that may exist in other crisis communication outlets, such as additional social 
media sites. This would address whether this disconnect only occurs on Twitter, or if it is 
an issue that spans all social media sites.  
  
 
 
   66 
 
Conclusion 
 In summary, this research sought to fill an important gap in the literature on crisis 
communication response strategies and recommendations in SCCT by examining NPOs’ 
Tweets before, during, and after Hurricane Matthew. The study qualitatively coded for 
SCCT response strategies and recommendations (Coombs, 2015), and found additional 
responses present in the organizations’ Tweets. The results indicate that at least over 
Twitter, there is a potential disconnect between SCCT theory and practice. This study 
expanded knowledge in crisis communication and NPOs over Twitter in three major 
ways. First, Twitter is still emerging and developing, and crisis communicators are still 
figuring out how to use the new platform to effectively share information. Second, the 
vast majority of SCCT research and application has focused on corporations. The data 
from this study show that there is something different happening with NPOs’ 
communications. And third, SCCT makes assumptions about target audience. The results 
of this study show that the organizations’ Twitter audience is much broader than the 
organizations may have accounted for when preparing their response strategies. 
First, Twitter is an important emerging platform. Past research findings indicate 
that the medium is more important than the message when it comes to crisis response 
strategy and communication (Schultz, et al., 2011). This research found that Twitter 
provides a unique opportunity for organizations to adjust their SCCT response strategies 
and recommendations based on their goals to reach the broader audience that Twitter 
provides. Past research using SCCT has relied heavily on surveys, quantitative content 
analysis, and experimental design, which has not allowed for thorough examination of 
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actual output of organizations’ messages. Additionally, it has not allowed for a thorough 
examination of the medium of Twitter as it relates to the response strategies of NPOs. 
This research was able to show the importance of the emerging platform of Twitter for 
communication during crises, as well as the need for NPOs to adjust to this platform and 
use it as an opportunity to effectively communicate with their audiences.  
Second, this research found that the actual content of the Tweets provided insight 
into the role that NPOs play during crises, which is different than the role corporations 
play. Prior SCCT research has not addressed NPOs, or differences between corporations 
and NPOs. This research could perhaps explain why Sisco, et al. (2010)’s research found 
that The ARC’s crisis response strategies between 1997 and 2007 did not match the 
recommendations in Coombs’ SCCT. This was the only other study that used SCCT to 
address the response strategies of a NPO. The current study found that SCCT 
recommendations are geared toward corporations, and do not account for the unique 
characteristics of NPOs. This explains why Sisco, et al. (2010) found that The ARC was 
not using the recommended response strategies. The strategies are for corporations and 
need to be adjusted to fit with the goals of NPOs’ communications during crises.  
Third, this research contributed to the notion of target audience, which is unique 
on Twitter given the broad audience the medium entails. Lachlan (2014) found very few 
significant differences in audience Tweets during Hurricane Sandy. This research added 
to those findings by addressing the other side of the two-way communication on Twitter, 
by looking at potential differences between the way organizations communicate. There 
were not many differences between organizations’ communications based on target 
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audiences. Keeping the two-way communication open to all audiences allows for 
information to reach a wider audience, and therefore information about where and how to 
donate can be disseminated. Combining Lachlan (2014)’s findings and the results of this 
research, it can be concluded that during both steps of the two-way communication 
provided by Twitter, communications did not depend on or focus on target audience. This 
contributes to the literature on Twitter as a means for two-way communication and the 
way it facilitates community between organizations and the audience.  
 This research addresses some important questions in the area of crisis 
communication response strategies outlined in SCCT, and how they translate into 
communications over Twitter by NPOs. It allowed for understanding the actual output of 
organizations’ communications over Twitter before, during, and after Hurricane 
Matthew. The results of this study advance our understanding of SCCT in three 
substantial ways. First, the data show how SCCT response strategies can be used over 
Twitter as an emerging platform in crisis communication. Second, NPOs are a unique 
type of organization not previously accounted for in SCCT. And third, the broadness of 
the target audience allows and will continue to allow NPOs the unique opportunity to 
reach a wide range of people in order to address their goals and missions to provide 
information and relief in the wake of crises like Hurricane Matthew.   
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Appendix A 
Crisis Response Strategies, by Posture (Coombs, 2015) 
 Denial Posture 
Attacking the Accuser The crisis manger confronts the person or group that claims 
that a crisis exists. The response may include a threat to use 
force (e.g., a lawsuit) against the accuser. 
Denial The crisis manager states that no crisis exists. The response 
may include explaining why there is no crisis.  
Scapegoating Some other person or group outside of the organization is 
blamed for the crisis.  
 Diminishment Posture 
Excusing The crisis manager tries to minimize the organization’s 
responsibility for the crisis. The response can include denying 
any intention to do harm or claiming that the organization had 
no control of the events that led to the crisis.  
Justification The crisis manager tries to minimize the perceived damage 
associated with the crisis. The response can include stating that 
there were no serious damages or injuries or claiming that the 
victims deserved what they received.  
 Rebuilding Posture 
Compensation The organization provides money or other gifts to the victims. 
Apology The crisis manager publicly states that the organization takes 
full responsibility for the crisis and asks for forgiveness.  
 Bolstering Posture 
Reminding  The organization tells stakeholders about its past good works. 
Ingratiation The organization praises stakeholders. 
Victimage The organization explains how it too is a victim of the crisis.  
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Appendix B 
SCCT Recommendations for Crisis Response Selection (Coombs, 2015) 
 
1. Provide instructing information to all victims or potential victims in the form of 
warnings and directions for protecting themselves from harm. 
2. Provide adjusting information to victims by expressing concern for them and 
providing corrective action when possible.  
Note: providing instructing and adjusting information is enough of a response for 
victim crises in an organization with no crisis history or unfavorable prior 
reputation. 
3. Use diminishment strategies for accident crises when there is no crisis history or 
unfavorable prior reputation.  
4. Use diminishment strategies for victim crises when there is a crisis history or 
unfavorable prior reputation.  
5. Use rebuilding strategies for accident crises when there is a crisis history or 
unfavorable prior reputation.  
6. Use rebuilding strategies for any preventable crisis.  
7. Use denial strategies for rumor crises.  
8. Use denial strategies in challenges when the challenge is unwarranted.  
9. Use corrective action (adjusting information) in challenges when other 
stakeholders are likely to support the challenge. 
10. Use reinforcing strategies as supplements to the other response strategies.  
11. The victimage response strategy should be used only with the victim cluster.  
12. To be consistent, do not mix denial strategies with either diminishment or 
rebuilding strategies.  
13. Diminishment and rebuilding strategies can be used in combinations with one 
another.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
